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THE INCLUSIVE DYNAMICS OF ISLAMIC UNIVERSALISM:
FROM THE VANTAGE POINT OF
SAYYID QUTB’S CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY
ANDREA MURA
ABSTRACT: This article pursues a topological reading of Milestones, one of the most
influential books in the history of Islamism. Written by Muslim thinker Sayyid Qutb, the
general interest in this crucial text has largely remained restricted to the fields of Islamic
Studies and Security Studies. This article aims to make the case for assuming a philosophical
standpoint, relocating its significance beyond the above-mentioned fields. A creative and
topological reading of this text will allow the spatial complexity of Qutb’s eschatological
vision to be fully exposed, while also unpacking the way in which antagonistic relations have
variously been articulated by this thinker. The underlying conviction is that such an
examination can offer new perspectives from which to examine and develop current debates
on political universalism and antagonism in the tradition of continental philosophy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The question of universalism – for all its attendant complexities and ambiguities – is
on the intellectual agenda again. One should acknowledge, for instance, Žižek’s
defence of universalism against globalisation; that is, the universalistic endorsement
of a space for political litigation against the multicultural ideology of a peaceful
global order (Žižek 1999). Similarly, Badiou’s engagement with St. Paul’s
universalism has been central to philosophical debate (Badiou 1997/2003) whereby
religious universalism has been instrumental to rethink lay forms of political action in
what has been called a “communist appropriation of Christianity” (Coombs 2009, 1).
This article finds inspiration in this question. The ambition from the outset is to
widen the spectrum of political reflection, enriching the speculative analysis of lay
and Christian forms of universalism with an insight into Islamic universalism.
Although this rejuvenated interest in the notion of universalism has brought the
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concept to the centre of academic debate in Europe, a gap in the examination of nonWestern traditions has in fact marked such a discussion, leaving similarities and
differences among speculative notions of “universal” space and community
substantially unexplored. In an attempt to confront the potential risks of Eurocentrism
of political theory (Thomas 2010, 654), this article will pursue a critical analysis of
Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, one of the most influential books in the history of the
twentieth-century Sunni Islamic political movement, proposing a topological reading
of this crucial text.
Defined as the “ideologue of Islamic revival” (Haddad 1983; Musallam 2005),
Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) has been one of the most prominent thinkers in the Muslim
world. Qutb incarnated a difficult moment in Islamist history, a phase, between the
1950s and the 1960s, characterised by the wide repression of Islamist movements by
Arab regimes, and by the quasi-dormancy of Islamist action. While his execution by
the Nasser regime in 1966 was testament to the difficulty of this phase, his discourse
anticipated, beyond any ambiguity, the attempt to revitalise the Islamic tradition in
what has been called the “rejuvenation”, “revival” or “return” of Islamism in the
1970s (Lewis 1976; Mandaville 2007). His vision was central in challenging “the
imposition of a monolithic Arab nationalist-socialist discourse on Egyptian society”,
therein countering the dominant role that nationalism played during this time
(Moaddel 2005, 218). The exemplary value of his thought, however, transcended the
social and historical context. His last work, translated either as Signposts on the Road
or Milestones, (Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq) and published in 1964 (Qutb 1964/2006), has had
a massive impact on several generations of Muslim activists and believers,
influencing the way that antagonistic relations have been articulated by many Islamist
groups (Calvert 2010). This has been true, in certain respects, for organisations such
as the Muslim Brothers whose political focus has rested primarily on the reformation
of domestic politics, not a universal Muslim community. Milestones’s influence,
however, has also been felt in the formation of transnational views of those such as
bin Laden, inspiring the particular antagonistic position that so-called “neofundamentalist” groups have assumed in recent decades in what they often perceive
as a globalised and post-national world (Roy 2004). Described as “one of the most
widely read and controversial Arab books of the twentieth century”, Milestones
stands as Qutb’s political manifesto (Starrett 2004, 55). In both its concision and
clarity of argumentation, the text has represented a potent tool of political
mobilisation. As Roxanne L. Euben puts it: “Qutb’s thought can serve as a window
into the world of contemporary Islamic fundamentalist political practice; as Qutb’s
most influential and radical book, Signposts is the text that has significantly
influenced such practice” (1999, 56).
In this general context, references to Sayyid Qutb have largely remained restricted
to the fields of Islamic Studies and Security Studies.1 While important works have
1

Security Studies is generally understood as an area of inquiry in post-Cold War international
relations examining the challenges to international security related to organized violence, and the
sources and conditions of war and peace.
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been published recently that have scrutinised distinct aspects of Qutb’s theoretical
position (references will be offered in the following pages), they mostly aimed at
assessing the impact of Qutb’s theory on Islamic political practice rather than
considering it in the light of broader philosophical debates in the critical humanities.
An Islamic studies audience has mostly remained the target for such remarkable
endeavours, replicating the positioning of Qutb in the “area” of Islamic studies. Aside
from these contributions, a quick Internet search shows that Sayyid Qutb’s name is
also predominantly associated with analyses on global jihad, terrorism, and political
violence. This tendency has certainly been reinforced post-9/11 with the coming to
prominence of Islamist organisations on the stage of world politics. Sayyid Qutb’s
role as an ideologue of contemporary Islamic movements has thus taken precedence
over the more analytical aspects of his theory.
This article aims to make the case for assuming a philosophical standpoint in the
analysis of Sayyid Qutb’s Milestones, relocating its significance beyond the abovementioned fields. The objective is to pursue a creative and topological reading of this
crucial text, allowing the spatial complexity of Qutb’s eschatological vision to be
fully exposed, while also unpacking the way in which antagonistic relations have
variously been articulated. The underlying conviction is that such an examination can
offer new perspectives from which to examine and further develop the debate on
universalism and contemporary forms of antagonism. In asking the reader to follow
me in this article, I will strive to maintain a language accessible to an Islamic Studies
non-specialist, resorting to concepts and categories widely used in continental
philosophy (contingency, necessity, antagonism, vanguardism, etc.). Thus a certain
effort of cultural translation will be enacted, in relation to which a few caveats are
required.
Firstly, in attending to texts from outside a “Western tradition”, this article does
not want to neglect the indeterminacy of concepts such as East and West or dismiss
the on-going fluctuation and circulation of ideas that underpins their very symbolic
constitution as discursive categories. This attempt is rather to point to the hegemonic
empowerment that these concepts instantiate, contributing to develop what has been
called “an epistemology of the South” (Santos 2007). This topological examination of
Milestones aims therefore “to uncover” forms of knowledge that were masked,
concealed, silenced, or simply ignored by juridico-political discourses over
citizenship, accounting for ideas of territoriality and community in non-Western
sources (Isin 2012). Secondly, to engage in such a considered explanation entails
leaving a comparative analysis between Qutb’s and continental ideas of universality
aside from this article. The choice here is to postpone a close scrutiny of their
similarities and differences for future investigation. Such a comparison would not
only detract space from the kind of in-depth examination of Milestones that will be
proposed here, but would also benefit from assuming, as a point of departure, the
different observations that will be made. That said, it is important to briefly explain
the wider political and intellectual significance of Milestones for an Islamic Studies
non-specialist audience, and the utility of the following topological reading. A salient
trait of Qutb’s universalism can be located in its ability to imagine a form of
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universalistic space marked by inclusive antagonistic dynamics. At first instance, to
uncover this spatial configuration in this article will help to grasp Qutb’s counterhegemonic use of Islamic universalism vis-à-vis dominant discourses on nationalism
in his post-colonial times, therein assessing the territorial specificity of this tension.
But an insight into this spatial model in Milestones, will also contribute to the
continental critique of a so-called “post-ideological” world and the multicultural
promise of a “peaceful” global order “with each part in its allocated place” (Žižek
1999, 200).
As widely discussed over the last two decades, the increasing demise of partypolitics, the growing relevance of technocratic and managerial problem-solving
procedures in institutional arenas and the discursive emphasis on the ability of late
capitalism to accommodate social tensions by way of consensus-seeking procedures
which render social conflict unnecessary and ideological divisions obsolete – have all
informed neo-liberal discourses in different degrees (Ranciére 1999; Hardt and Negri
2000; Badiou 2006; Žižek 1999). Although the recent financial crisis seems to be
challenging this long-standing process, for years the mantra of a “post-ideological”
world has contributed to a de-facto de-politicisation of society and the demobilisation
of democratic struggles in what has been called the “end of politics” (Rancière 2007,
6). According to Žižek, postmodernist theory, with its emphasis on
“multiculturalism” and “identity politics”, has contributed to excluding the very idea
of political struggle. By reformulating systemic problems as personal issues and
promising to offer an exhaustive account of individual or particular demands, postmodernism has reinforced the promise of a cosmopolitan future of harmony and
prosperity. This helped to demobilise resistance and political conflict, strengthening
hegemonic power relations (Mouffe 2005).
From a psychoanalytical perspective, conflict plays a central function in the
organisation of social relations in that it allows the subject to symbolise and channel
the tension with alterity. Such a tension is somehow unavoidable and constitutive of
the subject, marking the ever-precarious relation between the self and the other.
Discourse on the promise of perpetual peace, without any need for confrontation,
ends up neglecting the social function of conflict, its ability to allow for a symbolic
relation with the other through which difference can be mediated in a dialectical and
productive way. Erasing conflict from the social and political vocabulary has
coincided with the increasing difficulty to symbolise and channel the relation with the
outside, allowing this tension to emerge in the form of “violence”. This tendency is
well reflected in Žižek’s analyses of contemporary outbursts (Žižek 2008a), or
Chantal Mouffe’s assertion that the liberal prevention of disagreement, together with
its denial of discontent, has allowed for the development of violence and terrorism
(Mouffe 2005). In this context, Milestones’s universalism reveals the emergence of a
complex dynamics, which is rooted in the upholding of a “permeable” idea of limit
between inside and outside, the citizen and the non-citizen, allowing for forms of
inclusion of the outside that mediate the ever ambivalent relation with exteriority.
Although crucial differences exist between Qutb’s counter-hegemonic
universalism and continental accounts of universality, to which I will briefly hint at in
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the conclusion, to examine the inclusive dynamics of Qutb’s universalistic vision is
useful in consideration of the debate on the de-mobilising effects of neo-liberal postpolitics. In this respect, this topological reading will help unfold the
multidimensionality of Qutb’s antagonistic model and his way to account for conflict.
Moreover, it will also contribute to the general debate on universalism providing it
with a spatial representation of what a universal surface could look like, within which
enduring flows and transformations can be accounted.
In fields as different as cultural geography, political theory and psychoanalysis, an
increasing use of topology has attempted to consider space using metaphors of
proximity, closeness, neighbourhood and transformation rather than simply distance.
With its emphasis on holes and sutures and its attention for qualitative traits rather
than quantitative properties of geometrical structures such as lengths, degrees, and
areas, topology has offered crucial tools for critical investigations. In the humanities,
this has allowed for consideration of complex structures in their totality, addressing
elements of contiguity and transformation and producing new ways of representing
and problematising subjectivity formations. A topological analysis will prove then to
be essential in exposing the spatial and temporal complexity of Milestones. It will be
the task of this article to uncover the multifaceted dynamics of Qutb’s universalism,
its internal flows and movements between specific planes such as: inside and outside;
necessity and contingency; and reality and virtuality.
2. SAYYID QUTB’S NORMATIVE VISION
In her noteworthy study of Qutb’s political theory, Euben interprets Milestones as a
tripartite analysis of contemporary political communities. According to Euben such
an analysis would consist of a “diagnosis of the ills of modernity (jahiliyyah), a cure
(rebellion, followed by the establishment of sovereignty based on Islamic law), and a
method of implementing the cure (organising a counter-community, jama‘a, and
spreading it through jihad” (1999, 56). In the following textual examination of
Milestones a different organisation of this structure will be proposed, entailing critical
differences in terms of spatial and subjective configurations. According to this
reading, a twofold dimension, embodying both a descriptive and a normative register,
informs Qutb’s view of the human condition in Milestones. On the one side, Qutb
provides a critical description of the contemporary predicament in which mankind
lives, something akin to the level of diagnosis in Euben’s analysis. On the other side,
a discussion of how humanity should be and live according to human nature, as it was
created by God, intersects with the descriptive level. This latter register entails a
dimension somewhat irreducible to the former, and placed on a different temporal and
spatial “plane”. An inquiry into these two spatial dimensions is essential to
distinguish between different forms of antagonism in Qutb’s discourse.
The basic norm to establish how a society should be, therein acceding a normative
level of analysis, is best exemplified by a passage where Qutb defines Islamic society
as “that which follows Islam in belief and ways of worship, in law and organization,
in morals and manners” (1964/2006, 93). At a first general level, the realm of Islam is
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qualified by a particular definition of “sovereignty” (hākimiyya) as derivative of
God’s will on earth, and its fundamental equation with two other main signifiers:
“freedom” and “human civilisation”:
When, in a society, the sovereignty belongs to God alone, expressed in its obedience to
the Divine Law, only then is every person in that society free from servitude to others,
and only then does he taste true freedom. This alone is “human civilization” (Qutb
1964/2006, 94).

This passage evidences the central position played in Qutb’s articulation by the
notion of “sovereignty”, and by the particular semantic relation that such a signifier
establishes with “God”. It is this relation that gives “sovereignty” its specific
connotation, differentiating it from alternative notions of sovereignty, and thereby
enacting the possibility for “freedom” and “human civilization” to be realised at all.
With alternative notions of sovereignty, I refer in particular to its specific rendering in
modern political thought. In continental juridical doctrines, sovereignty had been
conceptualised as the supreme “power” (summa potestas) giving “force” and
“authority” to a political order by way of its “absolute and perpetual” (Bodin),
“exclusive and indivisible” (Hobbes) essence. The supreme power of a political order
was thought of, therefore, as the original, unrestricted and unique source of
legitimacy of state control, which does not recognise any superior principle of power
outside itself. Among early Islamist trajectories, for instance in the discourse of
Hasan al-Banna – the founder of the Muslim Brothers, there had been a certain
tendency to re-articulate the notion of “sovereignty” along modern lines. This implied
depriving “sovereignty” of its transcendental character and re-directing it from God to
the immanent power of the people of the nation. As al-Banna put it: a “truly Islamic
government” was one performing “as a servant to the nation in the interest of the
people” (al-Banna 1940s). Unlike al-Banna, Qutb articulates God’s sovereignty in
purely transcendental terms. This means that even in cases where Islamic society
takes the form of a state, such a juridical construction would remain substantially
alien to the model of the nation-state. In this scenario, the Islamic government would
find its inner legitimisation outside itself; that is, in God rather than in the immanent
power of the state or the people of the state (as with modern sovereignty). Hence, a
certain downplaying of the very notion of Islamic state in Qutb and the prioritisation
of an Islamic community devoted to the direct application of the shari’ah.
The definition of sovereignty in transcendental terms entails a double movement.
On the one side, his traditional reading of sovereignty implies an upward re-directing
of sovereignty from humankind to God:
They [Arabs] knew that “uluhiyah” means “sovereignty”, and they also realized that
ascribing sovereignty only to God meant that the authority would be taken away from the
priests, the leaders of tribes, the wealthy and the rulers, and would revert [emphasis is
mine] to God (Qutb 1964/2006, 24).
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This position is reinforced by another statement in which Qutb expressly rejects
the possibility of having not only lay but also religious authorities incarnating or
interpreting Islamic law, while suggesting a strict and literalist application of the
shari’ah.
The way to establish God’s rule on earth is not that some consecrated people - the priests
- be given the authority to rule, as was the case with the rule of the Church, nor that some
spokesmen of God become rulers, as is the case in a “theocracy”. To establish God’s rule
means that His laws be enforced and that the final decision in all affairs be according to
these laws (Qutb 1964/2006, 58).

On the other side, an extensive and horizontal movement allows Qutb to state the
traditional Islamic significance of sovereignty as embodied by Islamic law, depriving
it of all modern interpretations that have reduced shari’ah to a matter of legal
injunction:
In Islam the meaning of the “Shari'ah” is not limited to mere legal injunctions, but
includes the principles of administration, its system and its modes […] Similarly, it
includes political, social and economic affairs and their principles […] It deals with the
morals, manners, values and standards of the society, according to which persons, actions
and events are measured (Qutb 1964/2006, 107).

When defined in this way, shari’ah expresses an all-inclusive and integral
conception of life. This is particularly important considering that Qutb is adamant in
defining an Islamic society in traditional terms assuming a universal
conceptualisation of ethics, which is not reduced to the logic of public interests. A
society in which sovereignty is taken to express God’s will, needs then to be
articulated in an ethical model involving every aspect of human life (Khatab 2002;
2006). In his biography of Qutb, John Calvert argues that Qutb’s reliance on a
“Qur’anically justified concept of God’s judgment and dominion” aimed to
“undermine the theory and practice of state sovereignty which undergirded the
Western-dominated global order” (Calvert 2010, 215). From this perspective, Qutb’s
eschatological vision is intimately related to the political dimension of his
universalism. The counter-hegemonic potential that Qutb ascribes to his universalistic
conception of human society vis-à-vis the discourse of the nation, a discourse playing
a dominant role in Middle Eastern societies during his times, is therefore central to
understand the specificity of his vision.
From a general perspective, nationalist discourses can be identified for the
fundamental link they establish between three key signifiers: “sovereignty”,
“territory” and “the people”, whose articulation, I contend, is intimately related to a
binary conceptualisation of space and subjectivity. In regard to “sovereignty”, we
have seen that Qutb deploys a transcendent reversion from humankind to God, and
that this movement also implies an integral and horizontal expansion of sovereignty
undoing the secular dichotomies such as those between private and public, political
and religious. Qutb’s rejection of national signifiers, however, is also evidenced by
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the dismissal of the modern concepts of “territory” and “people” in favour of
traditional signifiers like dar al-Islam and the ummah.
At first glance, Qutb’s assumption of a fluid and inclusive notion of community in
the form of the so-called ummah marks the difference with its nationalist counterpart,
“the people”. In examining the historical process leading to the formation of
European nations, the identification of local populations with the signifying image of
the people has entailed the articulation and mobilisation of a strict dualism (Delanty
1995; Balibar 1991; Young 1995). Hardt and Negri, for instance, noticed that the
construction of the national people entailed overemphasising similarities in blood,
language and history while, at the same time, subsuming differences within the
unitary spiritual dimension of the people (Hardt & Negri 2000). An indivisible sacred
Self was thus constituted which was put in radical antagonism with all that remained
external to it.
A point of differentiation can thus be detected in this respect when considering
the Islamic notion of ummah, as the representation of the Muslim community had
traditionally required a strong symbolic emphasis on a notion of integration. The
inclusive stance of the ummah was celebrated through the reference to the variety of
ethnic groups that, at different times, took pre-eminence over the ummah, assuming
the historical role of its diffusion and expansion as in the dominion of Arabs,
Mongols, Turks and so on. Talal Asad, for instance, claims that members of every
community imagined the Muslim ummah to be grounded in a specific normative
character and related to each other on the basis of that feature. “The crucial point
therefore is not that it is imagined but that what is imagined predicates distinctive
modes of being and acting” (Asad 2002, 197). This means that while functioning as a
universal abstract principle, the ummah was grounded in a multiplicity of differing
actualisations, each one defining a “particular” (cultural, historical), self-governing
“mode of being” of that universality. In other words, the inclusive universality of the
Muslim community stood for its ability, in principle, to include differences. Its
oecumene did not dissolve its internal distinctive dynamics, but articulated them as a
multiplicity of singularities expressing their historical and cultural manifestations.
Qutb’s alignment to a fluid conception of ummah, which in its vocabulary is also
called the “Islamic society”, is unequivocal. In a short passage, he formulates his
position in explicit terms:
Islam based the Islamic society on the association of belief alone, instead of the low
associations based on race and color, language and country, regional and national
interests […] Among the concrete and brilliant results of this attitude was that the Islamic
society became an open and all-inclusive community in which people of various races,
nations, languages and colors were members, there remaining no trace of these low
animalistic traits (Qutb 1964/2006, 49).

From a normative perspective, therefore, a perfect Islamic society should be “an
open and all-inclusive community” [emphasis mine] integrating all differences within
its multiplicity. This implies thinking of the Islamic community as an immediate and
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inclusive presence, and then rejecting various forms of nationhood as “low
animalistic traits”. It is important to stress that, defined like this, such a
conceptualisation of the ummah reflects a state of necessity. That is, Islamic society
alone allows “humanity” to emerge and develop. It figures as a necessary condition
for the very realisation of “humanity”; the absence of this condition would qualify
human life as a mere “animalism”:
In whatever society Islam is dominant, whether it is an agricultural or industrial society,
nomadic and pastoral or urban and settled, poor or rich, it implants these human values
and morals, nurtures them and strengthens them; it develops human characteristics
progressively and guards against degeneration toward animalism (Qutb 1964/2006, 97).

In his recent analysis of Qutb’s ethical model, Andrew March drew from Rawls
the concept realistic utopia to describe a comprehensive theory of political life that
“not only posits a true doctrine of the good or the right (i.e., the substance of moral
obligation for persons and societies), but also contains an account of how that theory
does not contradict what we know about human moral psychology” (March 2010,
192). From this perspective, to define Islamic society as a necessary condition means
to point to the immediate adaptability and convergence that Qutb instantiates between
humanity and the ethical and normative framework that God has reserved for it. This
is central to operate a disjuncture between the uniqueness of the Islamic normative
system, which only responds to humans’ own characteristics, and other normative
systems that alter the very “human” quality of mankind. The state of necessity that
Islamic society incarnates entails in fact the assumption of a universalistic and
inclusive approach to subjectivity, which overcomes the particularistic features that
nationhood is said to involve with its emphasis on “low associations”. It only
preserves the spirit of the human genre preventing its degeneration into animalism.
From this perspective, the refusal of national affiliations, from local forms of
belonging to pan-Arab or pan-continental loyalties implies, for Qutb, formulating
communitarian ties not on the basis of geographical adjacency or biological traits
(lineage or race), but as a commonality of choice and belief.
This marvellous civilization was not an “Arabic civilization”, even for a single day; it
was purely an “Islamic civilization”. It was never a “nationality” but always a
“community of belief” (Qutb 1964/2006, 49-50).

A further element of differentiation from the discourse of the nation is reflected in
Qutb’s reactivation of the traditional concept of dar al-Islam vis-à-vis the idea of
national territory. Again, in considering the historical process leading to the
formation of the modern nation-state, the intimate link existing between a dualistic
logic and the national concept of “territory” has been amply debated. Foucault, for
instance, pointed to the increasing process of rationalisation of land occurring during
the consolidation of the modern state, which ended up entailing a necessary and
exclusionary model of space, as the end of my territory necessarily coincides with the
beginning of yours (Foucault 1977-1978/ 2007). Hence the radicalism of precise and
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definite national borders demarcating a clear-cut, shared, and necessary distinction
between us and them.
In traditional universalistic terms, instead, the Islamic conception of territoriality
was articulated through the notion of dar al-Islam (the “domain of Islam”; also
referred to as “abode of belief”). Although this was introduced by a number of jurists
as a label of classification and was not a proper Qur’anic term, nor was it a new
concept in medieval times (it somehow resonates with the universalistic notion of Res
Publica Christiana), it ended up playing a central function in organising Islamic
jurisprudential thought about territoriality. Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer
tracked the line of theoretical and historical development of what they saw as the
“dynamic, accommodating processual notion of dar al-Islam” (1980, 18). These
authors considered Islamic territoriality to be based on “interaction patterns —
human, environmental, systemic” so that, because of “context- and timedependence”, its integrity relied on a sort of “spatial response” and not “spatial
immutability” (1980, 2). Dar al-Islam remained for a long time inclusive and
accommodating, regulated by difference and integration, with an outside (nonMuslim lands in the form of dar al-harb) treated as a temporary differential space to
be subsumed under the banner of the Islamic universalism. Early jurists of Islam,
however, had to acknowledge the existence of lands ruled by non-Muslims. While the
juridical notion of dar al-Islam was used to define the domain of faith and to
designate Islamically-ruled countries, the notion of dar al-harb (the abode of war or
chaos) began to be deployed for any land outside Muslim jurisdiction. Although in
classic universalistic formulations of dar al-Islam discourses present differences over
time, here the outside expressing the domain of unbelief – the dar al-harb – is not so
much a constitutive and necessary space for the very articulation of dar al-Islam. It
rather reflects a contingent factor to be subsumed and integrated within the
universality of Islam.
In Qutb’s normative vision, we found a clear attempt to recover the category of
dar al-Islam, re-elaborating its universalistic premises. In his discourse, a full
realisation of humanity necessitates the universalisation of Islam and the rejection of
animalism and unbelief. This is the path that mankind should follow in order to abide
by the supreme law of God as well as to its own humanity. The universal
implementation of Islam as being consubstantial to the full realisation of humanity
expresses what I define as a state or plane of necessity – where Islam is taken here to
reflect the ideal of both the Islamic ummah (subjective formation) and its territorial
and juridical transposal in the dar al-Islam (spatial representation). Now, if the state
of necessity presupposes the ideal universalisation of dar al-Islam, the contingency of
history entails that such universalisation is hampered by the very presence of nonMuslims. Here, dar al-Islam figures in the contingency of history as a partial reality
competing with some sort of outside, the dar al-harb. I define the plane where
historical events take place and where dar al-Islam and dar al-harb appear as
historical particular or partial manifestations as the state of contingency.
Since in Qutb’s eschatological vision the full realisation of humanity requires
establishing Islam as a totality, dar al-harb can only appear as a temporary historical
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manifestation that dar al-Islam should be able to absorb. Such a movement would
allow dar al-Islam to dismiss its particular character in the state of contingency
assuming a permanent and universal dimension and thereby affirming the state of
necessity. In other words, the dar al-Islam should be able to subsume the dar al-harb
in the contingency of history. This would allow dar al-Islam to figure as an allencompassing totality. But should this happen, it would mean that the state of
contingency and the state of necessity coincide and that the necessary ideal of Islamic
universalism would have found a breach in history. Hence, in principle, it is the
inclusive nature of the pan-Islamic theoretical model that connects necessity and
contingency. In this respect, dar al-harb stands as a simulacrum that appears on the
surface of an inclusive dynamic. By “dynamic”, I mean quite literally the “force”
which promotes change within a certain process. The term simulacrum refers then to
the very existence of dar al-harb as a transient historical “phenomenon” in the
inclusive movement leading to the universalisation of Islam. This implies that dar alharb is seen by the viewpoint of Islamic universalism as something that appears
temporarily but that, sooner or later, will necessarily be absorbed by dar al-Islam. It
can thus be said that, despite the fact that it figures as a contingent manifestation, dar
al-harb already expresses the Islamic universality as a form of potentiality.
Such a movement can best be illustrated by resorting to the topology of the
Möbius strip. It is well known that the Möbius is a three-dimensional figure that, like
other topological figures, subverts Euclidean ways of representing space. Unlike
simple shapes of Euclidean geometry where all points are set in a plane and neat
distinctions can be drawn between the internal and the external, this figure
problematizes all referents of interiority and exteriority. Although it seems to embody
a two-sided dimension, its structure has only one side and only one boundary
component: by travelling on one side, one ends up on the other side of the strip.
Because of their properties, Euclidian figures can conveniently be used to illustrate
the spatial dimension of those political formations whose discursive organisation
relies on a binary logic. For instance, the space of nation can be represented through
the delineation of a circle with its circumference epitomising the national border and
therein allowing for a neat (though paradoxical on a substantial level) separation
between the inside of the nation and its respective outside. The stronger the
demarcation of such a circumference is imagined, the more hypertrophic and rigid the
distinction between the national inside and its outside (e.g., radical forms of
nationalisms). What is distinctive about the Möbius, instead, is that although the very
organisation of space through referents of interiority and exteriority is preserved, this
is done exposing it to change, inclusivity and contingency. While the two sides of the
Möbius can be clearly distinguished at any one point, in their local dimension, when
the strip is traversed and assumed as a whole it becomes clear that they are in fact
continuous. In spite of the static dimension the circle, it is time that allows the two
sides of the strip both to emerge and to become indistinguishable along the movement
employed to traverse the structure.
When using this topological model, dar al-harb emerges as a transient, particular,
contingent and historical manifestation lying on one of the two apparent sides of the
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strip. The other apparent side of the strip is incarnated by dar al-Islam which,
similarly, figures here as a transient, particular, contingent and historical
manifestation. Both dar al-harb and dar al-Islam express – as the two apparent sides
of the strip – the state of contingency. Dar al-harb figures, however, as a simulacrum,
which is deemed to disappear because the movement along the strip allows dar alIslam to emerge clearly, thereby absorbing dar al-harb and enacting the inclusive,
necessary, and permanent movement of Islamic universalism. Dar al-Islam therefore
reflects a twofold dimension. On the one side, it coincides with one of the two
apparent sides of the strip, which it continuously competes with and absorbs dar alharb at the level of contingency. On the other side, it also coincides with the overall
inclusive surface of the Möbius strip itself, which reflects the state of necessity
permanently incorporating historical contingency. The dar al-Islam thus functions as
a connecting point between necessity and contingency. The integration of dar al-harb
within the contingent domain of dar al-Islam, and the consequent subsuming of
contingency by necessity within a permanent and inclusive movement constitutes
what I define as Islamic inclusive universalism. Given Qutb’s normative formulation
of Muslim subjectivity in the form of the Islamic society, how is territoriality defined
in relation to such a speculative framework?
In line with traditional universalistic discourses, Qutb’s spatial re-articulation of
dar al-Islam maintains an inherently universal and necessary character, paralleling
and sustaining the fluid and universal notion of the Islamic community. In this
respect, Qutb asserts dar al-Islam as the only possible form of territoriality that
Muslims should conceive as acting against communal or national forms of
identification:
A Muslim has no country except that part of the earth where the Shari’ah of God is
established […] a Muslim has no nationality except his belief, which makes him a
member of the Muslim community in Dar-ul-Islam (Qutb 1964/2006, 119).

Since, as we have seen, the establishment of God’s sovereignty alone allows
“humanity” and “freedom” to be expressed, the dar al-Islam reflects the necessary
condition for mankind to exist; that is, to develop, collectively, its very qualities of
“humanity” and “civilisation” (Qutb 1964/2006, 124). Such an understanding of dar
al-Islam renounces any physical conceptualisation of territoriality and stands as the
immaterial surface of a new communitarian and spiritual linkage. The ecumenical
reference to “God” or “Islam” now subsumes old distinctions of blood, culture and
geography:
Only this is Islam, and only this is Dar-ul-Islam – not the soil, not the race, not the
lineage, not the tribe, and not the family […] The homeland of the Muslim, in which he
lives and which he defends, is not a piece of land; the nationality of the Muslim, by
which he is identified, is not the nationality determined by a government; the family of
the Muslim, in which he finds solace and which he defends, is not blood relationships
(Qutb 1964/2006, 124).
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This connection among three main signifiers, “necessity”, “spirituality” and
“universality” sustains the particular connotation that the dar al-Islam assumes vis-àvis the national concepts of “territory”. From this perspective, it should be stressed
that Qutb acknowledges the attempts made by imperial, national or other alternative
political systems to supersede divisions among their constituencies. Such experiences,
however, are rated as failures, which produced new discriminatory distinctions. The
domain of Islam alone can succeed in the realisation of its universal message:
Various societies have also appeared in modern times. For example, consider the British
Empire. It is like the Roman society to which it is an heir. It is based on national greed, in
which the British nation has the leadership and exploits those colonies annexed by the
Empire. The same is true of other European empires […] Communism also wanted to
establish a new type of society, demolishing the walls of race and color, nation and
geographical region, but it is not based on “human relationship” but on a “class system”
[…] Islam, then, is the only Divine way of life which brings out the noblest human
characteristics, developing and using them for the construction of human society (Qutb
1964/2006, 50-51).

If “necessity”, “spirituality” and “universality” define the meaning of dar alIslam, how does Qutb characterise the very existence of dar al-harb, especially in the
face of the national idea of the outside? We have seen that Qutb unambiguously
rejects the very notion of nationality and its inner dichotomous distinction based on
race, lineage and geography, constructing dar al-Islam as an immediate presence
whose nature is necessary and self-asserting, as Nietzsche might say, as a
“triumphant yes-sayer” to itself (Nietzsche 1887/1989, 19).2 It is true that an outside,
dar al-harb, is also represented here, but it emerges by way of a secondary movement
that is not assumed as a necessary condition for the presence of Islam itself. The
national territory’s binary structure instead entails a primary definition of the domain
of the outside against which, in the guise of an absolute opposition, it is possible to
think of the inside as a closed totality. While the national territory assumes its
respective outside as a constitutive and irreducible exteriority, the dar al-harb
remains a contingent and transient manifestation within history to be integrated, at
some point in time, by Islam.
In a crucial passage, Qutb reasserts the traditional “inclusive” notion of dar alIslam as able to integrate and articulate internal differences while, at the same time,
stating the presence of non-Islamic domains, the dar al-harb, on a very factual level:
The Muslim’s country has not been a piece of land, but the homeland of Islam (Dar-ulIslam) […] This Islamic homeland is a refuge for any who accepts the Islamic Shari’ah to
be the law of the state, as is the case with the Dhimmies. But any place where the Islamic
Shari’ah is not enforced and where Islam is not dominant becomes the home of Hostility
2

This schema aligns to Nietzsche’s distinction between “Good and Evil” and “Good and Bad”; that is,
between the dialectical logic of slave morality with ressentiment requiring a first, “necessary direction
toward the outside” and the values of a pre-Christian aristocracy focusing of self-affirmation
(Nietzsche 1887/1989, 19).
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(Dar-ul-Harb) for both the Muslim and the Dhimmi. A Muslim will remain prepared to
fight against it, whether it be his birthplace or a place where his relatives reside or where
his property or any other material interests are located (Qutb 1964/2006, 124).

It is clear from the passage above that Qutb acknowledges traditional views of
Islamic territoriality, for the dar al-Islam is said to embody within its jurisdictional
domain not only Muslim constituencies but also the dhimmi: non-Muslims living in
Islamic-ruled countries and enjoying forms of legal protection behind special
taxation. At the same time, the dar al-harb of non-Islamic ruled countries is
acknowledged as a matter of fact. Since the dar al-Islam must reflect the universality
of Islam, no outside would be possible on a necessary level. Thus dar al-harb can
only appear as a contingent manifestation that, sooner or later, will need to be
subsumed within the universality of Islam, so losing its external character and
becoming either an internal difference in the form of the dhimmi or a form of Muslim
singularity. As Middle East scholar Majid Khadduri puts it: “dar al-harb could not
possibly attain a normal or permanent status unless its inhabitants either adopted
Islam or accepted the status of the tolerated religions” (Khadduri 1955/2006, 145).
It should be pointed out, however, that within the multiplicity of discourses
informing the Islamic jurisprudential thought, a middle ground – the dar al-‘ahd (land
of truce) – was acknowledged as a practical device to ensure peace and stability with
non-Muslim lands and reduce the cost of a permanent jihad. It consisted of those
lands with which a formal agreement was made, guaranteeing the protection of
Muslims under foreign rule or the protection of non-Muslim regions behind tributary
taxation or within any area in which open warfare was absent (Salmi 1998). This third
temporary division remained subject to perpetual renewal as the limits between dar
al-Islam and dar al-‘ahd were never formalised, thereby moderating the polarity
between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. Moreover, a series of administrative devices
were elaborated across time to substantiate the inclusive and universal character of
dar al-Islam, tempering its potential antagonism, and ensuring a form of harmonious
stability. This is best demonstrated by the millet system, consisting of non-Muslim
communities in the Ottoman Empire – such as the Greek, the Armenian Orthodox,
and the Jews – that were incorporated into the institutional system of the Empire and
provided with the right to observe their religious affiliations and govern their internal
affairs (Karpat 1980; Tatsuo 1999). These devices allowed for official recognition of
possible spaces of exteriority that were constantly reproduced and formally
acknowledged. In principle, they did not undermine the inclusive structure of Islamic
universalism as their inclusion in the domain of Islam was maintained ideally and
postponed somewhere in the future, as if time would have naturally drove, at some
indefinite point, the dynamic topological shift from contingency to necessity.
Although Qutb expresses a more radical stance in this regard, as no mention is made
of the existence of dar al-‘ahd, the inclusive structure of this dynamics remains a
potential offshoot of this model. A form of inclusive differentiation here is constantly
re-produced in the antagonistic form of dar al-harb or in the more compromising and
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mediating form of dar al-‘ahd, which does not obstruct the universalistic projection
of a full-humanity.
With this overall structure in mind, it is crucial to highlight that an even stronger
polarisation could mark the “contingent” tension that Qutb’s normative vision of
Islamic universalism instantiates between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb. This could
happen if the temporary antagonism between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb “freezes”
into a definitive and irremediable counter-position that would ultimately interrupt the
inclusive relation between necessity and contingency. I contend that such a risk
clearly emerges when Qutb introduces his notion of jahiliyyah and undertakes a
critical analysis of the contemporary human condition.
3. SAYYID QUTB’S DESCRIPTIVE VISION
As I mentioned above, what appears to be a dynamic form of antagonism in Qutb’s
normative vision is somehow frozen as Qutb switches his focus to an analysis of his
contemporary times. It is here that a “descriptive register” is adopted:
If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that
the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah, [Ignorance of the Divine guidance] […] It is
now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of
claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to
choose any way of life, rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed (Qutb
1964/2006, 11).

A few caveats are needed in respect to the crucial passage above. First, it is clear
that Qutb is no longer defining how humanity should be on an ideal and normative
level, but is indeed describing how things on a factual and historical level are or
appear. The ideal of the Islamic society with all its creativity, humanity, and ability to
integrate difference (e.g. through the legal recognition of the dhimmi) is here
contrasted with the acknowledgment that “reality” is completely un-Islamic (jahili),
animalistic, and primitive. The difference between the ideal and reality, the Islamic
society and jahiliyyah is best represented through the distinction between a normative
and a descriptive level in Qutb’s work. A second point to be stressed from the passage
above regards the very notion of jahiliyyah. Unlike pre-Islamic ignorance,
contemporary jahiliyyah is described first and foremost by its immanent character.
That is, jahiliyyah figures as the social condition under which God’s will is replaced
with the immanency of human decisions, with the claim “that the right to create
values […] rests with men”. Finally, and critically, the transient and particular
appearance that dar al-harb covers in Qutb’s normative vision undergoes a sort of
crystallisation and pervasive expansion to the extent that “the whole world” is now
“steeped in Jahiliyyah”.
The notion of jahiliyyah to describe contemporary reality had already been used
within the realm of Islamist discourse. For instance, the Pakistani Islamist thinker
Syed Abul A’ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) had already deployed the classic concept of
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jahiliyyah to describe the domain of what, in traditional terms, was dubbed dar alharb. Equating the notion of dar al-harb, jahiliyyah stood for Mawdudi as a
historical, partial and transient manifestation of unbelief to be re-absorbed by dar alIslam through the very revival this thinker was advocating. Although Qutb was “an
avid reader” of Mawdudi (Calvert 2010, 213) and there is common tendency among
scholars to emphasise Mawdudi’s genealogical influence on Qutb’s more radical
aspects as developed during his time in prison (Moussalli 2005; Demant & Engineer
2006), a difference needs to be emphasised between the two, which strongly affects
the way in which forms of political antagonism are considered. Unlike Mawdudi,
Qutb’s understanding of jahiliyyah should not be seen as a condition somehow
informing the space of dar al-harb. We saw that in Qutb’s normative vision, dar alharb stands as a transient and partial manifestation competing with dar al-Islam in
the plane of contingency. On a descriptive level, instead, Qutb’s notion of jahiliyyah
implies that the Islamic community itself is erased and replaced by an overarching
and absolute un-Islamic surface, thus disappearing from the plane of contingency. In
this sense, jahiliyyah stands as an all-encompassing reality in the contingency of
history supplanting the Islamic society entirely and becoming a sort of totality, a
universality whose omnipresence does not acknowledge any outside:
The jahili society is any society other than the Muslim society; and if we want a more
specific definition, we may say that any society is a jahili society which does not dedicate
itself to submission to God alone, in its beliefs and ideas in its observances of worship,
and in its legal regulations. According to this definition, all the societies existing in the
world today are jahili [emphasis mine] (Qutb 1964/2006, 80).

Interestingly, Qutb differentiates between several kinds of jahili societies, each
one dominated by a particular discourse (“communism”, “paganism”, “nationalism”,
etc.). Within the global realm of jahiliyyah, we also find “Jewish and Christian
societies”:
All Jewish and Christian societies today are also jahili societies. They have distorted the
original beliefs and ascribe certain attributes of God to other beings (Qutb 1964/2006,
81).

Indeed, I showed that Qutb’s normative vision includes Christians, Jews and the
broader category of dhimmi under the domain of dar al-Islam. Now that Qutb is
assuming a descriptive register the Jewish and Christian societies are irremediably
inscribed in the omnipresent realm of jahiliyyah. This is a sign of Qutb’s adoption of
an extreme position when assessing the compatibility to Islam of existent human
societies. Even more symptomatic of this position, however, is the ultimate inclusion
of Muslim societies themselves within the overarching realm of jahiliyyah:
Lastly, all the existing so-called “Muslim” societies are also jahili societies […] Although
they believe In the Unity of God, still they have relegated the legislative attribute of God
to others and submit to this authority, and from this authority they derive their systems,
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their traditions and customs, their laws, their values and standards, and almost every
practice of life (Qutb 1964/2006, 82).

Although connected, the descriptive register enacts a structural transformation of
normative register, altering its inclusive system. On a broad perspective, such a
transformation is informed by a logic of replacement, as the dar al-Islam is now
replaced by an overarching “jahiliyyah” in the plane of contingency. This entails that
the Islamic community disappears as a partial and contingent manifestation,
becoming an absolute absence. So, while the distinction between a necessary and a
contingent level is maintained, the inclusive and universalistic harmony connecting
the two levels is interrupted. On the one hand, the omni-presence of jahiliyyah stands
as a totality at the level of contingency. Dar al-Islam is thereby relegated to the plane
of necessity alone, resulting in the loss of its quality as a fundamental connecting
point between the two levels. The absolute universality of jahiliyyah in the state of
contingency now opposes the universality of the Islamic society in the state of
necessity. On the other hand, the fact that dar al-Islam stops appearing as a concrete
historical manifestation means that it can now only be thought of as a promise to be
realised. A virtualisation of the Islamic ummah – its figuring both as an ideal and a
potentiality – accompanies the universalisation of the jahiliyyah.
In place of the inclusive pan-Islamic model of the Möbius strip that connected
necessity and contingency, we now find the overlapping of two circles expressing two
closed totalities – two universalities. On one side jahiliyyah, which is universalised
thereby occupying the whole spectrum of contingency. On the other side, the Islamic
community, which disappears as a partial manifestation at the level of contingency,
and stands as a virtual universality, i.e. a pure potentiality in the state of necessity.
The overlapping of the two circles reflects the disjunction between the planes of
necessity and contingency, which is established as an effect of the all-encompassing
presence of jahiliyyah in the state of contingency. In figurative terms, the emergence
of two overlapping circles marks the organisation of a strongly polarised spatial
model, somehow aligned to the sort of binary structure that informs political
discourses like nationalism. In the next pages, however, some important differences
will be traced in order to identify the specificity of what could be called a jahili form
of antagonism. It is important to highlight that the structural relation between the
descriptive and the normative registers finds expression in its figurative
representation. The return to a Euclidian plane characterised by the emergence of two
circles resonates with the kind of geometric alteration that is enacted when the
Möbius strip is cut down in the middle. The result here is that the strip is transformed
into a single loop with very different topological qualities as it now has two sides
instead of one. Metaphorically, the passage from the normative to the descriptive
register should be seen as a discontinuous transformation of the topological model
informing the former.
Before considering the antagonistic effects that the descriptive register enacts, it is
useful to point out that the virtualisation of Islamic society is by Qutb made explicit:
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According to our unvarying definition of civilization, the Islamic society is not just an
entity of the past, to be studied in history, but it is a demand of the present and a hope of
the future. Mankind can be dignified, today or tomorrow, by striving toward this noble
civilization, by pulling itself out of the abyss of Jahiliyyah into which it is falling […]
The values to which we referred above as human values were never attained by mankind
except in the period of Islamic civilization (Qutb 1964/2006, 103).

Except for the period of Islamic civilisation, the society of Islam in which human
values are expressed has been substantially absent from the contingent plane of
history. In the face of the “the abyss of Jahiliyyah”, the Islamic society stands as an
absent object of desire, “a demand of the present and a hope of the future” [my
emphasis]. With this assertion in mind, if history has testified to the gradual
universalisation of jahiliyyah and the consequent virtualisation of the Islamic society,
which kind of antagonistic relations can be traced for Muslims?
Two differing attitudes stem from this scenario. First, to strive on behalf of the
Islamic society could mean to re-establish dar al-Islam in the plane of contingency, to
assert its presence vis-à-vis its living absence, to promote its actuality vis-à-vis the
ultimate virtuality in which the Muslim community has been confined (actualising the
potential of such an ideal), and, finally, to re-establish Islam as an inclusive
universality. This would mean recovering the connecting function of dar al-Islam
ensuring its simultaneous presence in the state of contingency and in the state of
necessity. The osmotic relation between necessity and contingency would thereby be
re-ensured, and the Islamic universalism of Qutb’s normative vision would be reaffirmed. Secondly, to strive on behalf of the Islamic society could implicate
assuming the polarisation between Islam and jahiliyyah as definitive, so cementing
the dualism between necessity and contingency. Should this happen, the antagonism
of Qutb’s descriptive vision would thus have been crystallised, and its normative
universalism renounced. A radical antagonism would survive only, with the effect
that resistance to jahiliyyah would no longer aim at re-establishing the presence of
Islam in the contingent dimension of history, in “the here” where concrete political
interests can be posited and some form of compromise can always been found; rather,
it would endeavour to gain salvation and purification in “the hereafter”, where the
ideal of the Islamic society can only be realised. Hence, the Muslim community in the
form of a virtual object of desire based on a millenarist and puritanical vision in a
number of contemporary religious movements.
Differences occur in regard to the conceptualisation of Islamic revival as a
manner in which life is to be transformed for some and access to the hereafter is to be
attained for others. As far as Qutb’s position is concerned, a militant and “assertive”
request for “revival” takes precedence in his texts over the apocalyptic nuances that
very often also appear between the lines. This means that the normative vision of
Qutb overcomes the descriptive one. Despite the apocalyptic dimension surrounding
contemporary life, for the true believer the irreducible task remains to assert the
normative ideal of Islam, the need to recover the harmonious and inclusive
universality of dar al-Islam. Hence the opening utterance at the beginning of his
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book: “At this crucial and bewildering juncture, the turn of Islam and the Muslim
community has arrived” (Qutb 1964/2006, 8). It is here that Qutb’s notion of jihad,
the “effort” or “struggle” in the path of Islam, emerges as a central tenet, standing as
the duty to revive Islamic society in history. That is, to fight in the way of God,
calling for the soul of men “so that there may not remain any wall between Islam and
individual human beings” (Qutb 1964/2006, 72). and fighting those “institutions and
traditions which limit man’s freedom of choice” (Qutb 1964/2006, 75).
A last point to be discussed concerns the way Qutb conceptualises the relation
between the all-embracing environment of jahiliyyah and those believers who strive
to restore Islamic society. Qutb establishes here a fundamental disjunction between
“believers” and “true believers”. Such a distinction, in itself, is not a new one, for a
common discursive practice among Islamist movements has been to conceive of
Islam as a dormant force within Muslim societies to be revived by militant and
zealous believers. On the one side, we find the “partial Muslims”. That is, the
majority of Muslims confining religion to a private affair or to a spiritual, cultural and
ritual dimension. Thereby living Islam “merely as a part of a section of their whole
life” and drawing on other sources for the remaining aspects of their life (Mawdudi
1985, 116-117). On the other side, we find “true Muslims”, those who live the Islamic
message as an all-encompassing dimension affecting any aspect of everyday life, who
deploy activism to revive the social function of Islam.
Qutb makes this distinction more extreme. In spite of traditional views where all
“Muslims” share the common destiny of being part of an existent Muslim
community, in Qutb’s descriptive vision Muslim societies themselves are relegated to
jahiliyyah whilst dar al-Islam disappears from the contingency of history. This
certainly means that “partial Muslims” - regular believers who, for Qutb, disregard
the integral and exclusive dimension of Islam in life - are inscribed in the omnipresent domain of jahiliyyah. But would the “all-encompassing” presence of
jahiliyyah also mean that “true Muslims”, those who follow Qutb’s message to fight
to restore Islamic universalism, are themselves a jahili manifestation as long as they
live in the jahili contingency of history? This is a crucial point, for it compels Qutb to
formulate some notion of Muslim community in the state of contingency of his
descriptive vision. The problem could be formulated as follows: if the ummah is
absent from the plane of contingency, if it stands only as a demand, how should true
believers be thought of considering that they all are living parts of the universal realm
of unbelief? How should their dispersed and “fragmented” position as individuals in
the “ocean of jahiliyyah” be accounted?
In answering this question, it would seem that true believers “anticipate” the
Muslim community to come, realising a virtual illusion of presence of the ummah in
life. The “community” of the true believers does not eradicate the general assessment
of the state of contingency being a universal expression of jahiliyyah, for it stands as
a simulacrum; that is, a phenomenal apparition, a virtual anticipation of the Muslim
community to come. Although Muslim society remains a hope to be realised, it is the
community of “true believers” that allows Muslims striving in the path of Islam to
keep identifying with that promise, establishing some form of connection with that
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very object of desire in the state of contingency. Hence the logic of replacement
found in Qutb’s descriptive model. While the dar al-harb in his normative vision
figured as a simulacrum at the level of contingency, ultimately expressing Islamic
universality as a potentiality, the position of simulacrum at the level of contingency is
now covered by the community of true-believers. This community appears as the
virtual anticipation of a promise, the potentiality of the ummah, the Muslim
community to come.
To refer to the ensemble of dispersed true believers in the ocean of jahiliyyah,
Qutb deploys the notion of “vanguard”, which parallels the idea of a “virtuality” of
the ummah:
How is it possible to start the task of reviving Islam? It is necessary that there should be a
vanguard which sets out with this determination and then keeps walking on the path,
marching through the vast ocean of Jahiliyyah which has encompassed the entire world.
During its course, it should keep itself somewhat aloof from this all-encompassing
Jahiliyyah and should also keep some ties with it […] I have written “Milestones” for this
vanguard, which I consider to be a waiting reality about to be materialized (Qutb
1964/2006, 12).

It is through a “vanguard” to be “somewhat aloof” from an “all-encompassing
Jahiliyyah” that Qutb manages to articulate the anticipation of the community to
come. For such a community, this requires a paradoxical status as best evidenced by
the interesting expression “somewhat aloof”. The vanguard is both immersed in
jahiliyyah, the contingency of history, yet beyond it. By way of a virtual anticipation,
such a community represents its very opposite: the Islamic community to come. It is
necessary to assume the position of a single true believer as a highly dispersed and
fragmented one, for he or she is surrounded by an “all-encompassing” jahili
environment and only connected with other true believers in the virtual conception of
the vanguard. This dispersed position needs furthermore to be maintained even in
intimate relations such as familial ties, as “Islam” requires exclusive loyalty. In case
of the believer’s parents declaring “their alliance with the enemies of Islam”, in fact,
Qutb’s does not hesitate to state that “all the filial relationships of a Muslim are cut
off and he is not bound to be kind and considerate to them” (Qutb 1964/2006, 119).
This approach finds expression in the articulation of the signifier “vanguardism”
that groups like Hizb and al-Muhajiroun (an upshot of Hizb ut-Tahrir) have promoted
in the past by presenting themselves as an “elite vanguard” of the Islamic society yet
to be founded (Habeck 2006, 144). In his study of “neo-fundamentalism”, a term used
to refer to neo-orthodox groups such as al-qaeda, al-Muhajiroun and Hizb ut-Tahrir,
French scholar Oliver Roy suggests precisely this kind of pattern, describing the
vanguard community of true believers as a mental attitude, an immaterial and
“virtual” presence:
Radical militant jihadists fight at the frontier to protect a centre where they have no place.
They fight not to protect a territory but to re-create a community. They are besieged in a
fortress they do not inhabit. This empty fortress syndrome is related to the pathological
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dimension of their jihad. Contemporary mujahedin are pessimistic because they know
that there is no longer a fortress to protect, that the enemy is in the fortress (Roy 2004,
289).

This emphasis on “vanguardism” and “jahiliyyah” testifies to the influence that
Qutb’s vision continues to exert upon Islamist movements. In the global scenario
following Qutb’s death, his complex vision remains as a major source of inspiration
for new Islamist trajectories, marking a major turning point in the history of
Islamism.
4. CONCLUSION
This article pursued a topological reading of Sayyid Qutb’s most influential work,
Milestones, aimed at unfolding the spatial complexity of Qutb’s political theology and
exposing his antagonistic dynamics. In doing so, the article strived to uncover Qutb’s
universalistic dimension in what I termed a “normative” register, assessing its
counter-hegemonic potential vis-à-vis the discourse of the nation, a discourse that
plays a dominant role in global politics. This article went further, by including an
analysis of Qutb’s particular understanding of his contemporary world in what I
called a “descriptive” register. On a broad perspective, I contended that the
topological disjunction between a normative and a descriptive level is central to
distinguish between different forms of antagonism in this seminal text.
When considering philosophical and political debates on universalism, I
mentioned earlier that research interest in the West has renewed attention to this
concept in recent years. Non-western conceptions of universality, however, have
remained substantially unexplored. This can perhaps be explained by the feeling that
some sort of unintellegibility marks the tension/relation between western and nonwestern forms of knowledge. When comparing Qutb’s and continental universalistic
perspectives, for instance, it is true that differences cannot be underestimated.
Milestones’ universalism reveals an eschatological idea of world order where Islamic
territoriality, dar al-Islam, (ideally) absorbs its non-Muslim outside (dar al-harb),
realising a new form of human association which transcends closed, exclusive
communities based on soil, nationhood, blood, culture and so on. But while dar alIslam upsets and broadens previous groupings, it might require commitment to a new
set of substantive rules and norms: a commitment to a shared ethical form of life.
Conversely, universality in the Pauline tradition reveals a kind of universal space set
against this kind of ethical grouping. The contemporary interest in Paul seems to lie
precisely in the replacement (or destruction) of law with love; that is, Pauline
universality appears as an empty or content-less form of association. Hence, for
instance, Badiou’s and Žižek’s respective emphasis on the empty set and negativity.
The foregoing analysis has given emphasis to the crucial symbolic function that
God plays in the articulation of Qutb’s discourse. In resorting to God, Qutb is keen in
positing some substantial justification for the foundation of his philosophical edifice.
The attempt to re-interpret modern sovereignty in divine terms, allowing for an
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upward re-directing of it from humankind to God, and the very ethical and normative
appeal pervading his conception of humanity in the form of a “realistic utopia”
(March 2010, 192), bear witness to the crucial mobilizing power that an imaginative
symbolism predicated upon the discourse of prophecy assumes in his vision. On a
broad perspective, such a mobilising function is fully aligned to what Muhammad
Azadpur has recently described as a traditional objective in Islamic philosophy aimed
at the “realization of a human exemplar as the standard of wisdom” (Azadpur 2011,
4). According to Azadpur, this objective “is constitutive of the philosophical activity
as such – the transformation of the self for the sake of knowledge” and informs the
particular project that Greeks themselves reserved for philosophy, notwithstanding
common interpretations of Greek philosophy as a system of rational knowledge. What
stands as unique in Islamic philosophy is for Azadpur the appropriation of this
tradition “into a legacy of Islamic prophetology” (Azadpur 2011, 7). In the light of
such an interpretation, therefore, Qutb’s vision can be assumed as a philosophical
project aimed at the transformation of the self in accordance with the precepts
expressed in the religious discourse of prophecy. This is central to understand the
crucial role that jihad plays for Qutb as an “effort” and a fight in the “way of God”,
allowing for the moulding of a new believer devoted to the restoration of the Islamic
society. By pursuing the cultivation of the soul through a prophetic imaginative
symbolism leading to the liberation from the mundane and culminating in an
experience of the divine, Qutb’s hermeneutics fully adheres here to the Islamic
philosophical legacy that Azadpur discusses. What needs to be emphasised, however,
is that Qutb seems to assume religious faith as the immediate and necessary condition
to interpret and access the fundamental link between prophecy and philosophy. Such
a link is also constitutive of both the very descriptive “critique” that Qutb poses
towards his historical era, and the substantial judgment that he ascribes to any
possible conceptualisation of power and authority. Hence the symbolic power that the
discourse of revelation covers in Qutb’s rejection of immanentist accounts of
sovereignty. Hence also the fundamental counter-hegemonic tone of Qutb’s political
theology, a tone that both reflects and mobilises the influence that theologicalpolitical questions have traditionally exerted upon ideas of power, sovereignty, the
worldly and the spiritual and the relationship between political and religious authority
– an influence that current debates on political theology in its Christian and European
variants have similarly contributed to highlight.
In accounting for the differences at work between Qutb’s universalism and other
ways of engaging with ideas of political universalism, immediate emphasis is given
therefore to those forms of incommensurability that seem to mark the relation
between knowledges. This is not, however, to disregard the very possibility of
cultural translation between these traditions, dismissing any potential for creative and
productive exchange. As Boaventura de Sousa Santos recalls: “incommensurability
does not necessarily impede communication and may even lead to unsuspected forms
of complementarity” (Santos 2007, 38). The attempt to offer a topological insight into
Qutb’s thought, highlighting the philosophical dimension of his figure, was
fundamentally inspired in this direction by the persuasion that Milestones’
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universalistic model can provide new material for investigation in continental
philosophy. Although an exploration of Qutb’s contribution to specific debates as
well as a comparative assessment exceeded the scope of this article, the analysis of
Milestones can serve as a first step in examining the notion of universalism in
different traditions. This can help highlight the ideological potential that this concept
embodies in a globalised world. If anything, this article showed that Qutb’s postcolonial revitalisation of universalism parallels attempts in the critical humanities to
endorse forms of universalistic space marked by an anti-national and counterhegemonic stance. Like critical accounts of universality, Qutb furthermore pursues
such an endeavour by articulating a spatial model able to integrate differences and
preserve forms of political litigation.
Such a tension was crucially represented through the topological models
developed in this article, which could be re-elaborated in the analysis of convergent
forms of political subjectivity. When uncovering Qutb’s universalistic organisation of
Islamic space, for instance, I highlighted the ability of dar al-Islam to instantiate an
inclusive and structural relation with the phenomenal and contingent character of dar
al-harb as well as with the mediating quality of dar al-‘ahd. In this regard, a potential
adaptability of this spatial model could be explored to those continental conceptions
of universality that preserve forms of conflict and social justice pointing to an ongoing reproduction, acknowledgment and identification with the realm of the inhuman, the non-citizens. If considered beyond Qutb’s eschatological implications,
reverting the emancipatory focus on his inclusive structure – with the domain of
Islam becoming the universalistic space of the common, the multitude, or a global
citizenship, and the non-Islamic outside epitomising the ever-emerging and
positivised realm of the excluded, those “who have no voice” (Ranciére 1999, 208) –
such a topological representation could be assumed as a useful geographical model
for imagining the kind of spatial configuration that content-less forms of association
instantiate.
Finally, this article has exposed the most radical traits of Qutb’s vision,
unravelling a different spatial model in Milestones’ descriptive register, one that
abdicates to the ethos of his universalistic ideal in favour of a hypertrophic
organisation of space and antagonism. We could observe here a more rigid
configuration, one in which the universalisation of jahiliyyah and the virtualisation of
the ummah seclude the very possibility of an encounter with the outside, allowing for
the emergence of a vanguardist conception of resistance so central to western radical
traditions of political activism. It is these variations in Sayyid Qutb’s political
theology that this article disclosed, highlighting the complexity and richness of a
controversial as much as influential thinker.
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